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Ours is a confusing world, with a cacophony of meanings, identities, and 
constructions vying for precedence in both individuals and the social structures in which 
they operate. Those perennial questions - what it means to be human, how one is distinct 
from others, and where one belongs in the seemingly infinite sea of humanity - have surely 
been asked since humankind developed the most primitive cognizance. History may be a 
means of approaching such questions, by putting individuals in the contexts of their own 
heritage. It provides a sense of continuity, locating conditions of our existence in time and 
perhaps offering explanation for why they are so. However, what precisely constitutes our 
heritage, where we belong in a historical sense, is up for debate. 
Many have explored the possibility that common language, customs, and the 
historical ties which bring these commonalities about, bind us into groups or “nations.” 
Language, artistic expression, and lifestyle unify such a people, communicating shared 
understanding and past experience in a manner that is beyond the grasp of outsiders. An 
ancient homeland fixed them in space and played a role in defining their national identity. 
If offered self-rule, a nation could protect its cultural integrity, produce laws that fit its 
unique value system, and generally regulate its own affairs with awareness of intricate 
context. Misunderstandings and hostilities could likewise cause chaos in multinational 
states, often to the oppression of minority nations. 
This idea, gaining great popularity in the nineteenth century, left an enduring mark 
on intellectual activity, instigated revolutions and rebellions, and dictated both political 
structure and internal reform. The nation state became the ideal form of government. 
Having discovered themselves, nationalities would demand this autonomy or seek to 
consolidate national unity. The only problem is that, according to some recent scholarship, 
these nations as they understood themselves — objective units with ancient origins — 
simply did not exist. Rather, opportunistic or deluded intellectuals borrowed from existing 
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customs, languages, and historical legends to manufacture a modern identity and false 
history. This fictional identity would become a self-fulfilling prophecy as willing people 
were moulded into this national image through education, reform, and political activism. 
Nation-states were in fact political entities based on inventions from the minds of 
intellectuals, literally “states of mind”. 
Nationalism has been conceived in a variety of ways. Marxist historian Eric 
Hobsbawm1 asserted that nationalism was shaped by the bourgeoisie in order to preserve 
economic interests,2 and states and regimes intent on creating political unity.3 He 
emphasized both the importance of advancements in society, technology and economy in 
making possible these national movements,4 and the novelty of national conditions and 
traditions as part of this modern construction.5 While Benedict Anderson, in his influential 
work Imagined Communities, agreed that nationalism was the product of a historical 
process, he examined the change in ideas, in addition to economy, as a critical factor in this 
development.6 Anderson’s nationalism was not purely invented but rather formed itself by 
“misremembering the past.”7 The idea that national identity was a modern creation was 
contested by Anthony D. Smith, who asserted that it was drawn from ancient ethnic 
identities similar to their product but without a political end.8 Although these scholars 
differed in their opinions of the source of nationalistic ideas, they all observed the role 
intellectuals played in constructing historical interpretation for political ends.9 
It was precisely this issue that historian Patrick Geary stressed in The Myth of 
Nations.10 Geary asserted that modern history was founded upon nationalistic goals, and 
that because “official or quasi-official historians” obscure critical historical periods in order 
to support nationalistic priorities, history has become a “poisoned landscape.”11 Guided by 
politically-motivated searches for national identity and territories of “primary acquisition,” 
historians in Geary’s estimation fed nationalistic claims in spite of the fact that “nothing in 
the historical record justifies them.”12 He concluded that ethnicity (and, by extension, 
nationalism) could not be mapped because it “exists first and last in people’s minds,” with 
descendent political movements becoming dangerous and destructive forces “impervious 
to mere rational disproof.”13 In order to evaluate this dismal assessment of history, an 
examination of nationalism, and its relationship with history, is needed. 
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 Many scholars agree that nationalism as it is known today has origins in the French 
Revolution.14 Even if ethnic identities, as Smith proposed, existed prior to the concept of 
nationalism, the state structure required to organize the dissemination of a common 
language and national awareness was definitely a modern invention.15 On a more 
pragmatic level, the French Revolution became an example to those wishing to attain 
political autonomy in the form of statehood.16 However, the concept of nationalism was to 
be refined by German romantics who described the nation as an organic and historical 
entity naturally defining all those living within it.17 Admission into a nation was contingent 
upon historical and ethnic connection.18 As this idea spread to Central and Eastern Europe, 
where state borders did not correspond with the aggregation of perceived nations, national 
movements became characterized by demands to shape political realities around 
nationalistic interests.19 The connection between shared ethnic history and statehood was 
further cemented following the First World War. During what Hobsbawm termed “the 
apogee of nationalism,” nation-states proliferated under the Wilsonian principle of national 
self-determination.20 The eventual discovery that attempts to draw out complex ethnic 
borders could not satisfy all would-be nations, and the sobering connection between 
national interests of Nazi Germany and the ethnic cleansing of the holocaust, did not signal 
the end of nationalism.21 Scottish and Quebecois separatism, disputes over “homeland” in 
Palestine and Israel, and xenophobia in nations of Western Europe carry with them old 
assumptions of nationalism.22 
For the purposes of this essay, nationalism will be defined as an ideology with two 
key assumptions: (1) that there exist primordial, objective nations defined by shared 
descent, history, customs, and language; and (2) that these nations have a right or a need 
for self-government in their conceived homeland, usually in the form of the modern state. 
Nationalism is, according to this definition, a process of history in two ways. First, 
national identity is seen to be determined, in part, by a shared history which gives meaning 
to customs and draws a people together in a common narrative.23 Second, presentations of 
the fixed nature of a nation in history may be seen to legitimize claims for autonomy and 
continued possession of homeland. The historian, then, plays a key role in the conception 
and development of national awareness. 
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Miroslav Hroch divided nationalist movements into three phases: In Phase A, a small 
group of intellectuals defines the nation. Phase B occurs when these ideas spread through 
“concerted agitation” among a small number of devotees. Finally, the apogee of Phase C, 
sees the mass adoption and advocacy of these nationalistic priorities.24 The historian is at 
the core of the movement, instigating and giving direction to nationalistic revolutionary 
activity. First, the identity of the nation is contingent upon its interpretation of history. 
“Communal history,” wrote Smith, involving “foundation and liberation myths and [...] a 
cult of heroes” was used by intellectual-educators to explain “who we are, whence we came 
and why we are unique.”25 A nationalistic interpretation of the past provided a people with 
a sense of context and meaning, their own identity becoming woven into “a seamless, 
mythic entity [...] of history, religion, language, and customs.”26 National history, linking a 
people to its past, could then serve as a model for a supposed cultural restoration. Thus, the 
discovery of a Celtic “golden age” guided revolutionaries who used this history as a model 
of “what was authentically ‘ours’ and therefore what ‘we’ must do to be ‘ourselves’ once 
again.”27 
Attempts at national re-creation are observed most clearly in the second task of the 
nationalist historian, identification of an ancient homeland to reclaim. German nationalists 
popularized the use of philology, the study of ancient languages, in order to trace back 
geographical heritage and determine early territory.28 This development has been 
paralleled by ethno-archaeology, which classifies artifacts based on “ethnic markers.”29 
Scholars, in mapping this historical territory, are not simply engaging in disinterested 
research, but are drawing as well potential borders for nation-states, for, as Smith put it, a 
nation “needs before all else a national territory or homeland [which is] an historic 
home.”30 
Those historians contributing to national movements were distinctly forward-
facing: their research has very direct implications for the present day. Though, as Hroch 
noted, their initial audiences would be small groups of fellow-intellectuals, their work 
would eventually, if successful, feed a massive national movement. As such, presentation of 
their research was intended to spark nationalistic sentiments. Depictions of an ancestral 
homeland were “historical poetry” or a “modern romantic historiography,” instilling a 
sense of rootedness and attachment in loyal patriots.31 The national history was presented 
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as a “continuous narrative of national progress,”32 “the seamless connection between past, 
present and future.”33 The myth of national origin lacked only the final chapters, in which 
the motivated masses successfully achieve self-actualization in the form of statehood. 
“History means interpretation,” wrote E.H. Carr, “by and large, the historian will get 
the kinds of facts he wants.”34 National history is no exception. Geary boldly asserted that 
“claims that ‘we have always been a people’ actually are appeals to become a people - 
appeals not grounded in history but, rather, attempts to create history.”35 Smith is gentler 
in his judgement of intellectuals attempting to “undercut earlier definitions of the 
community,” admitting to “selective readings of an ethnic past” though maintaining that the 
selection “can only take place within [...] pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and 
memories” of their communities.36 If the role of nationalist historians is indeed to find 
national continuity through history, they will be required to fit their findings into the 
narrative of national unity. Furthermore, when involved in creative processes such as 
advocacy for autonomy or novel definition of national language, the historian is involved in 
a sort of reversed research, projecting onto the future rather than probing the past. 
We have examined, up to this point, the historian as a shaper in national 
movements. Yet is it not possible that these historians themselves are being shaped, 
directed, even blinded, by the dream of the nation? Does their engagement in current 
political movements limit or prohibit their essential “capacity to rise above the limited 
vision of [their] own situation,” or is such a standpoint an inevitable consequence of the 
historian being a part of history, even a means of illuminating “the past [...] by insights into 
the problems of the present”?37 Implicit in such questions is the purpose of history itself, 
and the extent to which academic disciplines should involve themselves in current affairs. 
We shall begin in France, the birthplace of nationalism. France had for centuries 
been a unified monarchy, but this long history was interrupted by revolutionaries 
attempting to re-make their nation on the foundation of liberty, equality, and 
brotherhood.38 The metamorphic French Revolution and its aftermath were intended to 
“make a tabula rasa of the past,” and many French historians of the nineteenth century 
rejected the idea that their Gaulish ancestors constituted a nation.39 Symbols of national 
unity such as the tricolore and La Marseillaise were unapologetically modern, inspired by a 
decided removal from past identity.40 Historian Jules Michelet was born into the aftermath 
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of the French Revolution, and throughout his life witnessed manifold movements of 
fragmented agitators vying to redefine France after their own interests.41 At a time when, 
in the words of one historian, “the urge to reduce French diversity into unity [had] proven 
implausible,” French historian Jules Michelet attempted to make sense of this protean and 
fractured past, and to reconcile the diversity of his nation into a unifying whole.42 
In accomplishing this end, Michelet found the political, rational Western nationalism 
of the French Revolution insufficient.43 He readily adopted organic descriptions of the 
nation, with its myths of origin, attachment to homeland, and perception of enduring 
national solidarity. In his introduction to World History, he connected ancient territory to 
primeval, racial attributes, stating that “powerful local influences [...] make a man one with 
the land” and “the land is reflected in him.”44 The diverse races Michelet identified as the 
forbearers of the French nation, products of their environment, would in turn shape 
France. The democratic interests and eloquent prose of France were of Gaulish origin, the 
nation inherits a style of ingenuity from the South, and a love of history could be traced 
back to Flemish ancestors.45 As through the ages this diverse mix of peoples steeped, they 
attained a “marvelous unity” which allowed them to adopt principles of liberty and 
equality.46 Thus the French Revolution was not a grand departure from tradition, but a 
continued expression of enduring French spirit. Far from the citoyen who defines himself 
and his country, Michelet’s child of France was a product of his climate and ancestry. 
Michelet readily bent historical findings to his nationalistic ends, yet he was equally 
willing to shape himself according to them.  The nation, he felt, was far more than a means 
to a political end, but a worthy cause in itself. Reflecting on his life’s work, Michelet 
declared “beloved France [...] I worked for you.”47 He maintained that such a noble cause as 
his motherland justified subjectivity, even disregard for facts.48 However, the idea that 
France was a distinct entity, its own creature, even a religion, lent a form of self-conceived 
objectivity to his work. In an account bordering on mysticism, Michelet described his 
“discovery” of this personage: “A great light appeared, and I perceived France. [...] I was the 
first to perceive her as a soul and as a person.”49 He would later address this being in a 
prayer of sorts, saying “you must take the place of God.”50 Michelet, an unashamed 
nationalist historian, consciously fashioned his work after the image of the great, unified, 
historical nation he envisioned France to be. 
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While France had pre-existing political autonomy and needed only a national 
character to enliven it, Czech historian Frantisek Palacky was involved in both the 
intellectual and political foundations of his nation. Bohemia had been part of vast empires 
and multinational states since the Middle Ages, and at the time of Palacky’s birth had been 
in Habsburgian control for over four hundred years.51 However, a history of relative 
autonomy within the Habsburg Empire, an unsuccessful Hussite revolt engraved in the 
Bohemian memory, and flourishing interest in Czech language, music, and art in the 
eighteenth century, provided Palacky with ample material for a national revival.52 
As a strong defender of Czech identity against German culture, it is ironic that 
Palacky was raised and educated in a German environment, and did not develop any 
attachment to his native language until his adolescence.53 In fact, it was likely during his 
studies at the Pressburg Grammar School, which has been described as “a small replica of 
Protestant German universities,” that Palacky was introduced to the German idea of 
nationalism which would influence much of his work.54 Prior even to his selection of 
history as a means to study it, young Palacky aspired to somehow devote his life to the 
benefit of his country.55 He would later rise to prominence as a Czech historian, heading 
such organizations as the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences and the Matice česká, and 
being selected as the official historiographer of the Bohemian Estates. It was in this 
position that he was commissioned to write what would become his definitive work, a 
history of Bohemia.56 Unlike Michelet, Palacky had no desire to quietly support his 
nationalist cause from behind a desk. Rather, he involved himself directly in two of 
Bohemia’s major political agitations. In the failed Revolution of 1848, he chaired the 
Slavonic Congress of Prague and helped draft two proposals for a revised Austrian 
constitution.57 He returned to politics in the 1860s, becoming a member of the Imperial and 
Bohemian Diet and presiding over the National Party, helping in negotiations between the 
Czechs and Vienna.58 At Palacky’s death in 1876, the Czechs “mourned him like a prince, or 
[...] like a father.” Though he did not live to see the independence of his homeland, his 
scholarship and activism in promoting Czech nationhood led to his recognition as the 
“Father of the Nation.”59 
Palacky’s work is characterized by the creation of a “nation myth,” the eternal 
animosity he draws between Czechs and Germans, and the transparent political 
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implications of his research. In a statement curiously similar to that of Michelet, a young 
Palacky promised that “my life and all my endeavours will be devoted to my country.”60 In 
his monumental History of the Czech Nation, he “defended [and] glorified the Czech past,”61 
and consequently “the objectivity and scholarly detachment of his writing unquestionably 
suffered.”62 He accepted the idea that the division of humanity into nations with distinctive 
characters and customs occurred “at the very beginning of the historical age,” making the 
nation something of a timeless entity.63 Not only did he provide an explanation for the 
current circumstances of the Czech people based on their national character, but he 
justified their subjugation because of positive attributes he gave them.64 However, their 
most defining feature is perhaps the fact that they are not German, their history being “a 
ceaseless battle” with this “predatory nation.”65 It is no surprise that Palacky considered 
the Hussite rebellion, a fierce Bohemian insurrection against Austrian Habsburg, to be the 
point at which “our nation reached the zenith of its historical importance.”66 His history 
was more than a praise of his nation’s virtues, as it also had unmistakable political 
undertones. 
History of the Czech Nation was written for Palacky’s own day. Much of it was 
completed after the 1848 defeat, during which time Palacky was under police 
surveillance.67 For all the German influences in Palacky’s history, he clearly emulated the 
rhetoric of the French Revolution when he asserted that “freedom and equality of all 
citizens [...] were principle features of ancient Slav society.”68 If the history of the Czech 
nation was a Hegelian battle between Bohemians and Germans, its future could be not so 
much a synthesis as a long-needed separation between two irreconcilable entities. 
The driving force behind Palacky’s work was the idea that his Czech nation needed 
to go through a process of self-realization that could only be undertaken once the foreign 
Germanic element was removed. Unlike Michelet, Palacky did not consider national 
inspiration and glorification to be the end of his work; rather, the patriotic love his writing 
instilled in others was to result in political action. Without the assurance of pre-existing 
political protection, the nationalist intellectual’s work changed, and success was achieved 
only with the realities of borders and governance. Palacky’s freedom-loving Czech nation, 
as much as Michelet’s unified France, was not so much a historical presence as a future for 
which he yearned. 
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If the purpose of history is indeed, as Ranke proposed, to “show how it really 
happened,” the national historians examined have done very poorly.69 Their presentation 
of the facts was selective and subjective, acceptable only when it depicted their respective 
nations according to their own perceptions. Their writings were successful not when they 
illuminate readers to the true conditions of the past, but when they sparked political action, 
feelings of unity and kinship, or even hatred towards opposing groups. On broader terms, 
distinction between past and present was blurred as nations attempt to create themselves 
based on these manipulated histories. Neither Michelet nor Palacky has provided an 
impartial, fact-based history because both prioritized national causes over objective 
research. Consequently, these historians have not enhanced understanding of the world or 
of individual identity, as both are contingent upon accurate rendition of the past. 
It is possible, however, that history has a greater cause than strict representation. 
History could also become a means to further what Michelet has termed “a cause of right 
and truth.”70 History as advocacy requires certain conclusions, and thus specific 
interpretations, which, as Carr argued, are “the lifeblood of history.”71 It could be argued 
that, because historians must inevitably be selective with facts and present them according 
to some perspective, it makes little difference if they do so in a with an eye to a nationalistic 
end. Carr, however, has justly observed that “it does not follow that, because interpretation 
plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no existing 
interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as another.”72 Though 
historians may never, has Carr has said, create a “wholly objective” interpretation, a 
flagrant sacrifice of facts on the altar of the national cause is a good way of ensuring that 
conclusions will be very distant from objectivity.73 
Yet it is possible that nationalist historians, as with the rest of us, are not fully 
conscious of their own intentions. There are probably few, if any, scholars who have not at 
some time disregarded evidence which seems anomalous according to their present 
conceptions. Or, put another way, can nineteenth-century nationalist historians be 
evaluated based on what is known about nationalism in the twenty-first century? Indeed, 
these historians were influenced by strong currents of ideas about the nature of politics 
and humanity. However, to conclude that they, the victims of such ideologies, could not 
help but study history in the way they did, is to imply that the historian is incapable of 
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stepping out of contemporary outlooks and examining the past on its own terms. “The 
historian who is most conscious of his own situation is also most capable of transcending 
it,” wrote Carr.74 Paradoxically, such self-awareness necessary for historical research can 
be achieved by the study of history itself, insofar as it produces understanding of other 
ways of thinking, and of the influences shaping one’s own perspective. Gaddis wrote that 
with empathy, and a mind open to the impressions of those studied, allow us to “view the 
past from its own perspective as well as our own.”75 Firstly, this means that while studying 
history, one must be willing to entertain perspectives contrary to one’s own. Secondly, by 
extension, this procedure can assist historians in seeing the present from these multiple 
perspectives. Although a perfect understanding of historical contexts, one’s own and those 
of others, may not be accessible, such an understanding may be deepened through an 
empathetic and perceptive study of the past. 
The nationalist historians were correct, then, in their assumption that a study of 
history is the key to greater understanding of oneself. The type of inquiry to attain such 
understanding, however, necessarily involves temporary suspension of one’s own 
preconceptions, rather than marching forward determined to prove them. Instead of using 
history to justify political or social goals, or selecting and romanticizing a choice collection 
of information based on a fixed interpretation of the past, the historian must search the 
past for the comprehension to more wisely define such ends. Amidst the cacophony of 
opinions and questions, those who have truly acquainted themselves with the perspectives 
of the past may more readily make sense of the current world, and more readily distinguish 
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